Yet item-level indigenisation leaves one question unanswered: can India perform the critical process required to make the component to military standard?
A component can disappear from an import list while dependence remains in the production knowledge, specialised equipment or qualification required to manufacture it.
India encountered this in the Adour aero-engine. High-pressure compressor discs had to be indigenised, but producing them required a specialised forging technology. The Defence Metallurgical Research Laboratory developed the process, transferred it to MIDHANI, and about 200 disc forgings were jointly produced and supplied to Hindustan Aeronautics Limited. India acquired the manufacturing capability that had been missing beneath the component.
MIDHANI later developed the manufacturing route for a specialised turbine-blade alloy used in the same engine. Its subsequent order for 5,000 blade blanks reduced dependence on a single imported source.
Other defence economies treat such processes as strategic capacity. In 2023, the US Department of Defense funded additional specialty titanium-casting capability used for turbine-engine components across the F-15, F-16, F-22 and F-35. The investment went into the equipment needed to perform the casting process because its absence created supply-chain risk across several aircraft programmes.
India already has an institution capable of carrying this work. The Department of Defence Production’s Indigenisation Division is mandated to analyse import dependence, coordinate indigenisation, monitor SRIJAN and identify strategically important items for the Positive Indigenisation Lists. The Defence Industries Promotion wing, headed by the Joint Secretary (DIP), has responsibility for defence indigenisation and defence-material matters.
That is where accountability for a critical-process review should sit.
For a strategically important component, the Defence Public Sector Undertaking or Service Headquarters responsible for the programme should identify any production process that remains unavailable from a qualified Indian source. The relevant technical or certification agency can validate whether the domestic process meets the required standard. DDP’s Indigenisation Division should consolidate those dependencies and monitor their closure.
Three implementation problems need to be anticipated.
Sensitive process information should remain on the government side; SRIJAN should receive only the industry opportunity that can safely be disclosed. Where several programmes require the same specialised process, DDP should assess their requirements together. A process that is uneconomic for one small order may support domestic investment once aircraft, missile or naval demand is combined.
Domestic availability also needs a resilience test. One qualified Indian producer may remove an import dependency while leaving a single point of failure at home. Capacity, alternative sources and major changes in programme demand should therefore remain visible after initial indigenisation.
None of this requires another portal or another institution. It requires India’s existing indigenisation machinery to look beneath the item it is replacing.
The measure should be simple: can India perform the critical process, at the required standard and scale, when the programme needs it?
